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Abstract: In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, 
given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked 
minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio-enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bio-
enhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This paper aims to 
show that the proposal Savulescu & Persson advance relies on several problematic 
assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. 
Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of Savulescu’s & Persson’s normative 
argument unravel once it is suitably clear how aiming to cognitively enhance an 
individual will in part require that one aim to bring about certain moral goods we show 
to be essential to cognitive flourishing; conversely, aiming to bring about moral 
enhancement in an individual must involve aiming to improve certain cognitive 
capacities we show to be essential to moral flourishing. After developing these points in 
some detail, and their implication for Savulescu’s & Persson’s proposal, we conclude 
by outlining some positive suggestions. 
 
 
1. Background 
Julian Savulescu & Ingmar Persson 1  take as a starting point some relatively 
uncontroversial observations: firstly, that there are a minority of individuals whose 
objectives are to cause, for example, nuclear or biological destruction on a mass scale; 
secondly, that such irreversible devastation is much easier to cause than is any 
corresponding good that could ever offset such devastation. They reason that the 
increase of scientific knowledge achievable through cognitive enhancement 
accordingly threatens to speed up the path to humanity’s destruction. Their 
injunction is that, in light of this doomsday risk, cognitive enhancement should not 
be pursued if not accompanied by moral enhancement, the latter which they take to 
be plausibly morally mandatory. 
Moral bio-enhancement, though currently in its nascency, would involve (for 
instance) enhancing individuals’ dispositions toward altruistic responses and sense of 
justice as fairness, perhaps by way of (for example) oxytocin2 , SSRIs, Ritalin, 
propranolol, and genetic treatment3. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See I. Persson & J. Savulescu. The perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent Imperative to 
Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity. J Appl Philos 2008 25(3), and I. Persson & J. Savulescu. 2012. 
Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press for an expanded 
discussion. Cf. I. Persson & J. Savulescu. Getting Moral Enhancement Right. Bioethics 2013 27:3: 124-131 
for a reply to J. Harris. Moral Enhancement and Freedom. Bioethics 2011: 25(2): 102-111, 107.  
2 Savulescu & Persson discuss oxytocin’s relationship with social behavior in J. Savulescu & I. Persson. 
Moral Enhancement, Freedom and the God Machine. The Monist 2012 95(3): 399-421. Meanwhile, M. 
Kosfeld, et. al. Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans. Nature 2005 435(7032): 673-6 links oxytocin with trust. 
3 Cf. T. Douglas. Moral Enhancement. J Appl Philos 2008 25(3): 228-245 on oxytocin and SSRIs. For more 
work on the most likely moral enhancers, see J. Shook. Neuroethics and the Possible Types of Moral 
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Savulescu & Persson’s argument4 has already been challenged on several 
fronts. A sample of some notable criticisms include the following: that it is not 
obviously easier to cause great harm than great benefit5; that moral bio-enhancement 
undercuts human freedom6; that moral virtue is not biologically achievable7; that 
Savulescu & Persson fail to appropriately consider non-authoritarian means of 
improving morality within a liberal democracy 8 ; that recent findings in moral 
psychology recommend more of a focus on traditional enhancement9; and that moral 
bioenhancement cannot be, in principle, adequately precise10. 
 While there is much to be said about all these criticisms, we will explore a 
strand of objection that is, comparatively, more fundamental, and which concerns 
the presuppositions of Savulescu’s and Person’s normative recommendations. Harris 
(2011) gestures toward this more fundamental issue in his remark that “there are 
good reasons to believe moral enhancement must, in a large part, consist of cognitive 
enhancement.” However, if this is right, it seems that Savulescu & Persson’s 
argument leaves us with a kind of paradoxical dilemma, in so far as we are to take 
their recommendations seriously in practice. As Fenton (2010) astutely observes: 
 
If we continue scientific research into non-traditional enhancement we are advancing the 
very body of knowledge that could prove to be our downfall, should the morally corrupt 
minority get their hands on it. But if we do not continue scientific research into enhancement, 
if we halt it out of concern for the consequences, then we have no hope of achieving the 
great moral progress that will ensure our survival of the species11. 
 
With regard to cognitive enhancement, then, it seems we are (as Fenton puts 
it) in a kind of “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario12. If the stakes are 
as high as Savulescu & Persson suggest, then this intractable dilemma would be more 
than an academic perplexity—it would be a grave practical hurdle. 
 
2. Sources of the Dilemma 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Enhancement. Am J Bioethics Neuroscience 2013 3 (4): 3-14. For the link between propranolol, negative biases 
and aversion to harming otherss, see Terbeck et. al. 2012. Propranolol reduces implicit negative racial bias. 
Psychopharmocology 222 (3): 419-24 and 2013. Beta adrenergic blockade reduces utilitarian judgement. Biol 
Psychol. 92 (2): 323-28. 
4 We are engaging primarily with the 2008 presentation of the argument. Savulescu & Persson also make a 
plea for the urgency of moral enhancement in their 2012 (op. cit.) However, the case specifically against 
cognitive enhancement is made more sharply in the 2008 paper. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
requesting clarification here. 
5 See Harris’s counterexamples (2011), e.g. the eradication of smallpox and polio. 
6 J. Harris, op. cit, 104-105. Inspired by Milton, Harris identifies one’s “freedom to fall” as a precondition for 
autonomous action. 
7 Fröding, B.E.E. Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life. Neuroethics (2011) 4: 223–234. 
8 R. Joyce. Review of J. Savulescu & I. Persson Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Analyis 
2013: doi: 10.1093/analys/ant021. Cf. J.F.P. Trivino. On the need of moral enhancement. A critical 
comment of “Unfit for the Future”of I. Persson and J. Savulescu. Resenas 2013:  
9  C. Zarpentine. ‘The Thorny and Arduous Path of Moral Progress’: Moral Psychology and Moral 
Enhancement. Neuroethics (2013) 6 (1): 141-53. 
10 J. Harris, op. cit. This objection focuses on Savulescu & Persson’s suggestion that the suppression of 
strong negative emotional reactions would be an important element of moral bioenhancement. Drawing 
from Strawson, Harris notes that strong negative emotions are morally appropriate/required under certain 
circumstances.  
11 E. Fenton. The Perils of Failing to Enhance. J Med Ethics 2010. 36: 148-151, 148. 
12 E. Fenton, op. cit., 148-151 highlights the moral costs associated with delaying cognitive enhancement until 
suitable moral enhancement is viable; see also J. Harris, op. cit., 108-110. For a critique of Fenton, see I. 
Persson & J. Savulescu. The turn for ultimate harm: a reply to Fenton. J. Med. Ethics 2011: 37(7): 441-444.  
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Given that Savulescu & Persson insist that there is an “urgent need for moral 
enhancement” but, additionally, sufficient reason “not to support cognitive 
enhancement in the foreseeable future” (Op. cit.: 1), the natural conclusion to draw is 
that we ought to promote human enhancement only in so far as what we are 
enhancing is moral as opposed to cognitive dispositions of human beings. This aligns 
naturally with the specific examples they have suggested13. However, it is a strange 
injunction. After all, if moral flourishing turns out to have inextricably cognitive 
components, then a qualified kind of moral enhancement (e.g. non-cognitive moral 
enhancement) would plausibly not vindicate their urgent plea for it.   
 There is a related worry about the underpinnings of their argument. They 
commit themselves to the following conditional: if C is a form of cognitive 
enhancement, then unless C is “accompanied by research into moral enhancement” 
(op. cit. 1), C should (for reasons of risk aversion) not be pursued14.  But if it turns out 
that certain varieties of cognitive enhancement inherently promote moral flourishing, 
this plausibly undercuts the argument for not pursuing them without also pursuing 
corresponding moral enhancement; in such cases, such a requirement would be 
redundant. These issues are symptoms of an underlying assumption Savulescu and 
Persson presuppose without question with regard to cognitive and moral 
enhancement--viz., that one form of enhancement could be in principle be prohibited 
while the other mandated15. A central objective of this paper will be to show why this 
assumption should be resisted16. 
 In §3, we will argue that to aim to bring about cognitive enhancement in an 
individual will be to aim to bring about a kind of cognitive flourishing that, properly 
understood, involves certain kinds of moral improvements—a result that makes the 
aim of cognitive enhancement less risky than Savulescu & Persson insist.  In §4, we’ll 
investigate the converse point—that there is a cognitive dimension that stands as an 
essential element of moral flourishing; accordingly, aiming to morally enhance an 
individual involves aiming to bring about a kind of cognitive flourishing. The sense 
in which the aims of cognitive and moral enhancement are interconnected stands at 
tension with the independence of these aims that Savulescu & Persson rely on in 
their normative mandate. 
Once these points are suitably clarified, we can avoid the sort of “damned if 
you do; damned if you don’t” dilemma that Savulescu & Persson’s proposal appeared 
to leave us with. In light of our conclusions from  §§3-4, we conclude in §5 by 
suggesting some avenues for further research that will be sensitive to the ways in 
which the aims of cognitive and moral enhancement are interconnected. 
 
3. The moral dimension of cognitive flourishing 
3.1 Enhancement and Flourishing: some preliminaries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See, e.g., the examples they credit to T. Douglas, op. cit.  
14 See §5 for a more detailed discussion. 
15 Note that this assumption Savulescu and Persson are making, and which is presupposed by their 
recommendation for a  “urgent need for moral enhancement” along with their suggestion that there is 
sufficient reason “not to support cognitive enhancement in the foreseeable future” (Op. cit.: 1), is an 
assumption regarding the independence of moral enhancement and cognitive enhancement as aims. By 
revealing this assumption to be problematic, we will challenge Savulescu’s & Persson’s assumptions but in a 
way that does not involve a defence of the (obviously implausible) view that cognitive enhancement is 
sufficient for moral enhancement, and vice versa. Of course, ‘cognitive’ and ‘moral’ are not co-extensive 
terms. Thanks to an anonymous referee for requesting clarification. 
16 Thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions regarding the presentation of this initial section. 
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Savulescu & Persson insist that the promotion of cognitive ends (e.g. by cognitive 
enhancement) will never, in itself, be enough to secure our moral ends; accordingly, 
from the fact that a subject S has been cognitively enhanced, it will never follow that 
S has been morally enhanced.17  
Their argument here relies on two claims. One expresses a kind of epistemic 
norm—that the aim of cognitive enhancement in either traditional or non-traditional 
forms is the facilitation or accumulation of knowledge. The other claim is about 
motivational psychology—that contra Plato, knowing that φ is the right thing to do 
does not by itself entail that one will in fact do φ18.  We agree that Plato’s account of 
moral motivational psychology is implausible; it is the claim about knowledge we 
shall challenge. 
 First, however, some conceptual points are in order. Cognitive and moral 
enhancement are normative notions; the very idea of enhancement carries with it the 
idea of something becoming better along some parameter of evaluation--viz., its 
constitutive aim. ‘Aim’ in this constitutive sense, should be contrasted with the 
‘intentional’ aim one adopts when one aims to bring a particular end about19. It will 
be worth drawing out this distinction more carefully. 
For two things, A and B, if A constitutively aims at B, then A’s aiming for B is 
part of what makes something A (rather than something else)—viz., it is part of A’s 
identity conditions that A aims at B; A (non-constitutively) aims at B when A’s 
aiming at B is not part of A’s identify conditions. Obama might (non-constitutively) 
intentionally aim at passing a certain piece of legislation, but his aiming to do so isn’t 
essential to his being Obama20. Conversely, we might say of beliefs, per se, that they 
constitutively aim at truth21; that beliefs are correct if and only if true is part of what 
makes an attitude a belief (as opposed to something else, e.g. a hope.)22  
This distinction is relevant because we submit that what makes a given 
enhancement the particular kind of enhancement it is (e.g. cognitive or moral) is its 
constitutive aim23. Put generally, for any domain of enhancement D, what makes 
enhancement D-enhancement (rather than, say, F-enhancement) is that D-enhancement 
constitutively aims at the promotion of D-flourishing.  
Now, what these conceptual claims imply with respect to moral enhancement 
is that: moral enhancement vis-a-vis S is enhancement aimed at the bringing about of 
moral flourishing in S, whatever moral flourishing involves. Of importance for our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Compare here with the weaker claim they are not denying: that in some cases, a cognitive enhancement 
would be a necessary ingredient in a moral enhancement, or vice versa. They concede this point in their 
debate with Harris. Thanks to an anonymous referee for stressing this point.  
18 On the Humean line, one might know f  is the right thing to do, but lack the appropriate desires or 
motivations to f. Likewise, on the Aristotelian line, one might know that f  is the thing to do, and desire 
to f  but suffer from akrasia, and so not f.  
19 Of course, this includes the aim of morally or cognitively enhancing an individual. Like the case of 
intentionally bringing about a belief--something that plausibly constitutively aims at truth--intentionally 
aiming to bring about moral or cognitive enhancement is just aiming to bring about something that is itself 
individuated by its constitutive aim. 
20 After all, his aiming to do so is a metaphysically contingent property (not a property Obama has in all 
possible worlds). 
21 This position is held by normativists about belief. See, for example, N. Shah. 2003. How Truth Governs 
Belief. The Philosophical Review, 112 (4): 447-482. 
22 To be subject to a norm in this way does not imply that it is always better, all things considered, for a 
belief to be true, rather than false.  
23 Constitutive aims do not imply any kind of intentional act of aiming (e.g. a belief is the sort of thing that 
is correct if and only if true regardless of whether a given believer intends to believe truly). 
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focus in the present section: cognitive enhancement vis-a-vis S is enhancement aimed 
at the bringing about cognitive flourishing in S, whatever this involves24.  
Now, as was noted, Savulescu & Persson assume that cognitive enhancement 
is enhancement directed at knowledge maximization25. In doing so, they implicitly 
identify cognitive flourishing with knowledge maximization. Although the 
accumulation of knowledge is surely an element of cognitive flourishing, it is far 
from clear that it is exhaustive of cognitive flourishing, or that it is, for that matter, its 
most salient aspect. 
 Consider, as Grimm (2012) has observed, that we make a kind of specifically 
cognitive gain when we move from knowledge to understanding26—from the point of 
view from which it is specifically our cognitive ends that matter, understanding is a 
better epistemic state to possess than knowledge. We desire not merely to accumulate 
propositional knowledge, but more over to grasp, as Miscevic (2012) puts it, “how 
things hang together”. 
 This thesis about the comparative cognitive worth of understanding and 
knowledge is widely shared in the epistemic value literature27. An implication for our 
present discussion is apparent: part of what aiming to cognitively enhance an 
individual involves is aiming to bring about in that individual a kind of flourishing 
that includes understanding, not merely knowledge. 
 If the attainment of understanding were also a moral good and not merely a 
cognitive good, this could be used to defend the view that cognitive enhancement 
(properly construed) is less risky than Savulescu & Persson suggest.  But this avenue 
doesn’t seem promising: as valuable as understanding is 28 , it isn’t clear how 
understanding is, itself, a moral good, even if understanding can facilitate the 
attainment of moral goods29.  
Unlike understanding, though, wisdom—as we shall see—is both an integral 
element of cognitive flourishing and a kind of moral good. 
  
3.2 Wisdom 
3.2.1 Wisdom as constitutive of cognitive flourishing 
Though Riggs (2003) takes understanding to be a greater cognitive good than 
knowledge, he uses the term “wisdom” to pick out whatever is the highest cognitive 
good30. In fact, it is common to suggest that wisdom is the highest epistemic or 
cognitive good31.  
 So what is wisdom, and what makes it so highly prized? Answers may well 
depend on the type of wisdom under discussion. Wisdom has after all traditionally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Thanks to an anonymous referee for having requested this part of the discussion be made clearer. 
25  See discussion of traditional cognitive enhancement as the “transmission of knowledge” (pp. 3-4). For a 
sample of some other remarks in which cognitive enhancement is equated with promoting scientific 
knowledge, see especially pp. 7-8. 
26 S. Grimm. 2013.“Understanding as Knowledge of Causes.” In Virtue Scientia: Essays in Philosophy of Science 
and Virtue Epistemology. Abrol Fairweather. Special Issue of Synthese. 
27 See, for instance, D. Pritchard. 2009. “Knowledge, Understanding, and Epistemic Value.” In Epistemology 
(Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures). Ed. Anthony O’Hear. New York: Cambridge University Press; J. 
Kvanvig.  2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
28 See here, especially, J. Kvanvig, op. cit, ch. 8. 
29 Put another way: understanding seems to promote moral value when it does by facilitating what is 
morally valuable in itself. But this much doesn’t make understanding any more morally valuable than, e.g., 
tools/equipment that enable us to engage in activities of moral worth.  
30 W. Riggs. 2003. “Understanding Virtue and the Virtue of Understanding”. In Michael DePaul & Linda 
Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Persepectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
31 See, for example, L. Zagzebski. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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been understood as consisting in two distinct varieties: practical wisdom and theoretical 
wisdom. This distinction corresponds to Aristotle’s terms phronesis and sophia, 
respectively. As Dennis Whitcomb (2010) notes, practical wisdom is often described 
as a kind of knowledge-how, where the knowledge at issue is knowledge how to live well32. 
Theoretical wisdom, meanwhile, is often taken to pick out something more akin to 
deep understanding of fundamental and or significant subject matters.  
Precisely delineating the distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom 
is a matter of longstanding controversy33. For our purposes, it suffices to note that 
both practical and theoretical wisdom (taken to correspond roughly to Whitcomb’s 
distinction between knowledge-how to live well, and deep understanding) are widely 
taken to be essential components of cognitive flourishing. One way to appreciate the 
point is to consider cases in which other cognitive goods are secured, but practical 
and theoretical wisdom (respectively) are lacking.  
 
SPORTS STATISTICS: Derek spends much of his time learning and 
memorizing sports statistics. What began as a hobby now consumes his time 
almost exclusively? His personal relationships suffer dramatically, his 
ignorance about the world (outside of baseball statistics) leaves him unable to 
make informed day-to-day decisions, and he finds interpersonal 
conversations increasingly confusing. 
 
COLUMNIST: Matilda, knowledgeable on a range of topics in science and 
mathematics, wants to be accepted. She asks Susan (a well-liked syndicated 
columnist) for advice. Susan specifies a long list of detailed advice for living 
well. Matilda accepts the advice unquestioningly, never considering why any 
of the pieces of advice might be true, or how it fits together. 
 
In SPORTS STATISTICS, Derek knows more propositions than most 
people but is nonetheless ignorant of how to live well, and it is plausibly on account 
of his lack of practical wisdom that his cognitive life is defective. In COLUMNIST, 
Matilda is both knowledgeable on a range of topics and, unlike Derek, she possesses 
practical wisdom: she knows how to live well because she has accepted the truths 
Susan has told her. Nonetheless, Matilda lacks any deep and significant 
understanding, and it is plausibly on account of her lack of theoretical wisdom that 
her cognitive life is defective. Such cases suggest that wisdom, in both its practical 
and theoretical guises, is an essential feature of cognitive flourishing.  
 
3.2.2 Wisdom as a moral good 
What is the relationship between wisdom and moral flourishing? Rather than claiming 
that wisdom, like knowledge, is merely an instrument that can be used in the service 
of achieving goods that are themselves of moral worth--a claim Savulescu & Persson 
would be happy to grant--we want to suggest that wisdom itself is a moral good. 
Specifically, whenever one’s wisdom is enhanced, so is one’s moral standing.  
 There are several ways to make this point. Regarding practical wisdom, the 
argument is simple: moral flourishing consists in living well, and while knowing how 
to live well (viz., possessing practical wisdom) does not entail that one actually lives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 D. Whitcomb. 2010. “Understanding” In the Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Eds. S. Bernecker & D. 
Pritchard. 
33 For recent survery, see J. Baehr. 2012. “Two Types of Wisdom.”Acta Analytica 27: 81-97. 
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well, it is a necessary element for doing so. An individual ignorant of what to do to 
live well will not do so, even if she has the desire to. Moreover, a common position 
on moral virtue is that practical wisdom is an essential component of rightly 
exercising moral virtue34. Without practical wisdom, then, one will de facto fail to 
possess moral virtue; and, moreover, one would not know what ends to bring about, 
even if one desires what a virtuous person desires. Living well involves practical wisdom. 
  With theoretical wisdom, the story is a bit different. As Whitcomb suggests, 
practical wisdom is most closely associated with the epistemic state of knowledge (or, 
knowledge-how), while theoretical wisdom is most closely associated with a certain 
kind of understanding. As Garrett (1996) puts it, wisdom “is that understanding … 
essential to living the best life35.” This aligns closely with Nozick’s (1989) view36. In 
each case, the understanding characteristic of wisdom concerns a subject matter that 
is morally relevant. 
There are at least three reasons for thinking that theoretical wisdom, as an 
epistemic state construed as a kind of deep understanding of morally relevant subject 
matter, has moral (and not merely cognitive) value. 
 Firstly, as Whitcomb notes, “every writer about wisdom that I know of 
subscribes to a kind of anti-wickedness condition, at least tacitly37” where a theory of 
wisdom (practical or theoretical) satisfies such a condition only if consistent with the 
observation that [unlike knowledge and understanding] wisdom and wickedness are 
taken to be incompatible38. But, if wisdom, by its nature, precludes wickedness, then 
the promotion of wisdom itself increases one’s moral flourishing.  
  Secondly, following Baehr (2012), theoretical wisdom is plausibly a kind of 
element of living well rather than merely a means to it, given the tight connections 
between theoretical and practical wisdom. As Baehr puts the point:  
 
It is entirely reasonable to think of deep explanatory understanding of epistemically 
significant subject matters as among the ends about which a person of practical wisdom 
might deliberate and make efforts to bring about… the practically wise person’s 
understanding of moral and other normative subject matters apparently will involve an 
element of the theoretically wise person’s grasp of the same39. 
 
 Thirdly, on a virtue-theoretic line 40  we have further reason to suppose 
wisdom enhances moral standing; on such a line, promoting wisdom cultivates in an 
individual not only other intellectual virtues, but also moral virtues (e.g. honesty, 
temperance, humility). Accordingly, it is no surprise that, as Isacc Asimov has 
remarked, “The saddest aspect of life right now is that science gathers knowledge 
faster than society gathers wisdom41.” 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 This is the classical Aristotelian line concerning the relationship between phronesis and the virtues.  
35R. Garret. 1996. “Three Definitions of Wisdom.” In Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom, ed. K. Lehrer, 
Philosophical Studies Series Volume 67, pp 221-232 
36 Nozick views wisdom as a kind of knowledge or understanding “you need… in order to live well and 
cope with the central problems and avoid the  dangers in the predicament(s) human beings find themselves 
in” (Nozick 1989: 267-268). Cited also in Whitcomb (2010, op cit., 8). 
37 Whitcomb, Op. cit., 18.  
38 Whitcomb himself demurs on this point. 
39 J. Baehr. 2012. “Two Types of Wisdom.”Acta Analytica 27: 91 
40 See e.g. R. Hursthouse. 2012. Virtue Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Fall 2012 Edition, who notes 
it is common to hold that that lacking practical wisdom is sufficient for failing to possess the virtues. 
41 Asimov and Jason A. Shulman's "Isaac Asimov's Book of Science and Nature Questions" (New York: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), p. 281. 
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4. The cognitive dimension of moral flourishing 
Just as there is a moral dimension to cognitive flourishing, there is a cognitive 
dimension to moral flourishing. In this section, we will take a closer look at the 
connection between emotions and moral flourishing, and submit that since moral 
flourishing involves an essential cognitive component then (contra Savulescu and 
Persson) it no longer makes sense to claim that we can aim to morally enhance by 
trying to make better features that exclude cognitive features. More generally, we call 
into question the presumption that moral enhancement is achievable out with 
cognitive enhancement.  
 
4.1 Emotions and moral flourishing 
There are good reasons to suppose there is a connection between emotions and 
moral flourishing; for example, consider Aristotle’s famous distinction between 
virtue and continence—the feelings of satisfaction involved in being truly virtuous 
suggest just such an important link between one’s moral character and one’s 
emotions. When exploring this apparent connection in more depth, it makes sense to 
start by looking at which emotions might most likely be essential. While there are 
many possible candidates, we can for the sake of simplicity focus on the emotions 
that Savulescu and Persson discuss in their treatment of moral enhancement. On 
their preferred view, at the core of our moral dispositions lies a disposition to 
altruism. They define altruism (p. 12) as ‘[sympathizing] with other beings, [wanting] 
their lives to go well rather than badly for their own sakes’, and note that ‘few would 
deny that this disposition is central to morality.’  
We agree—for example, in addition to being widely prescribed by a range of 
different religious and featuring in Hume’s work on sympathy42, the importance of 
responding appropriately to the suffering of others is highlighted in Aristotle’s view 
of compassion (and in the more modern account of compassion offered by 
Nussbaum (2001)43, to which we will return shortly).  
When looking at the emotions involved in altruism44, Savulescu & Persson 
suggest that a large part of altruism is, for example, feeling sad when others are 
wronged, and happy when life goes well for others. In addition, they make much of 
the dispositions from which our sense of justice or fairness arises. They hold that the 
most basic of the dispositions related to justice and fairness are the so-called “tit-for-
tat” dispositions45, for instance: feeling grateful or angry depending on whether a 
favour is granted or a harm is done, and more sophisticated responses such as feeling 
remorseful and guilty if you have wronged another without good reason, feeling 
pride or shame if you are more or less successful than others at returning favours, 
feeling admiration or contempt for others who are successful or unsuccessful in 
these respects, and feeling forgiving when you realize that someone is remorseful or 
blameless for a particular wrong. Savulescu & Persson note that if they are right to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 e.g. D. Hume. 2000. A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford Philosophical Texts), David Fate Norton and 
Mary J. Norton (eds.), Oxford, Clarendon Press. In particular, Hume articulated the nature of moral 
judgments in terms of expressing our feelings of approval and disapproval, connected to outcomes that are 
advantageous or disadvantageous, and where positive appraisals of states of affairs that benefit others 
besides ourselves are explained with reference to our capacities for sympathy. 
43 Martha Nussbaum, “Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions” (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
44 For work on the biological background of altruism, see Sober, E. and Wilson D. S. (1998) Unto Others 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard U. P. 
45 See e.g. Wright, R (1994) The Moral Animal, (New York: Pantheon) 
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think that the dispositions of altruism and justice are central to our morality, ‘moral 
enhancement will consist in strengthening our altruism and making us just or fair, i.e., 
properly grateful, angry, forgiving, etc.’ (p. 13). 
It is obvious, then, that Savulescu and Persson think that the aforementioned 
types of emotions are just the sort that are essential to moral flourishing46, and it is 
not hard to see why this is a sensible view47.  
 
4.2 Emotions as cognitive 
Now, given that some emotions are apparently essential to moral flourishing, 
consider that it is widely held that emotions involve a cognitive element. As Cates 
(2003) puts it, it is common to hold that emotions ‘involve thought, judgment, and 
evaluation’ and further, that ‘most scholars who study the emotions also agree that it 
is partly because the emotions have some relationship to thoughts—especially to 
beliefs and evaluative judgments—that they are appropriately subject to critical 
reflection and moral evaluation.’ (Cates 2003: 326).  
Importantly, strong cognitivist theories of emotions insist that emotions can 
be characterized in terms of their related cognitive processes and at least some as 
necessarily involving propositional attitudes. For example, emotions like anger and 
envy require believing that, say, someone else has done/possessed something in 
particular, and (in the former case) perhaps believing something about human dignity 
being lost or threatened48. Nussbaum (2001) advances a strong cognitivist line, 
according to which emotions just are thoughts or cognitions; this can be contrasted 
with the more moderate view that emotions merely include an essential cognitive 
component. For example, Nussbaum’s view holds that being angry at someone just is 
judging that they have wronged you. She submits that emotion-cognitions are ‘forms 
of evaluative judgment that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person’s 
own control great importance for the person’s own flourishing’ (p. 22). In brief, her 
argument for why emotions do not necessarily involve anything other than cognitions49 
(2001: 56-7) is that while some emotions may include one or more ‘nonthinking 
movements’ such as trembling hands, there is not a consistent correlation between 
particular movements and particular emotions (unlike the link between particular 
emotions and particular thoughts).  
Along with Nussbaum, Solomon (1980)50, and Neu51 (2000) also identify 
emotions with judgements, while other strong cognitivist views feature subtle 
differences—for example, Broad (1971)52 and Lyons (1980)53 characterize emotions 
as affect-laden judgements, and Marks (1982)54 endorses that view that they are sets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Savulescu & Persson also discuss less basic issues relating to emotion and enhancement, including racism, 
anger impediment and the notion of what they call “executive virtue”. 
47 For example, it is difficult to imagine an ideal moral agent who does not experience gratitude upon 
receipt of a significant favour, or respond negatively to unfair suffering visited on another. 
48 For instance, as will be the case when one’s anger is provoked by a perceived humiliation or insult. 
49 Nussbaum takes ‘cognitive’ to mean ‘nothing more than concerned with receiving and processing 
information’ (Op. cit.: 23).   
50 Robert Solomon, “Emotions and Choice.” In Explaining Emotions. Ed. Amelie Rorty. Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 251-81. 
51 Jerome Neu, “A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: the Meaning of Emotions” (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
52 C.D. Broad, “Emotion and Sentiment.” In Critical Essays in Moral Essay. Ed. ????. London: Allen and 
Unwin. 
53 William Lyons, “Emotion” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) 
54 J. Marks. 1982. A Theory of Emotions. Philosophical Studies, 42 (4): 227-242 
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of beliefs and desires. Of course, these cognitivist views are criticized55. It suffices for 
our purposes to register the position as a widely held view that may come in many 
plausible variations that are taken seriously in the debate about the nature of 
emotions. 
At this point, an obvious threat to Savulescu and Persson’s neat division 
between the moral and the cognitive emerges. If emotions are essential for moral 
flourishing and emotions are cognitive in nature, perhaps some of emotions essential 
to moral flourishing can be viewed as cognitive. As it turns out, many of the emotions 
that we suggested as necessary for moral flourishing (and on which Savulescu and 
Persson focus) fit well with the view of emotions as judgements56. For example, as 
Savulescu and Persson describe, gratitude could be the judgement that a favour has 
been done, and admiration the judgement that someone has done something 
laudable. Regarding the disposition to altruism more broadly, Nussbaum presents a 
detailed account of the cognitive structure of compassion. 
In sum, if it turns out that emotions that are (essentially, or even partly57) 
cognitive in nature are essential to moral flourishing, then part of what it is to morally 
flourish is inextricably cognitive, and the notion of moral enhancement without 
cognitive enhancement no longer seems to make sense58. 
 
5. Beyond ‘Cognitive’ and ‘Moral’ Enhancement 
5.1 A closer look at Savulescu and Persson’s proposal 
The crude conceptual distinction Savulescu & Persson draw between the cognitive 
and the moral is, granted, likely be sufficient for a wide range of commonplace 
purposes.  However, when the goal is to employ such a distinction in the service of 
deciding which types of enhancement should be urgently pursued or discouraged, the 
framework is insufficient for guiding action.  
 For instance, Savulescu & Persson insist cognitive enhancement must not be 
pursued out with corresponding moral enhancement, but what counts as sufficiently 
pursuing corresponding moral enhancement? For example, into what category would 
they place cognitive enhancements that are accompanied by research into how (or to 
what extent) those enhancements could also involve moral enhancements?  
Perhaps they would be willing to license cognitive enhancement only if large, 
well-funded projects prioritize and develop moral enhancements that are at least as 
(or, perhaps, significantly more) effective as the corresponding cognitive 
enhancement is dangerous. This has initial promise, though it’s not clear how any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Lyons (1980), Goldie (2000) and Elster 2003) claim cognitivism implausibly reduces emotional rationality 
to the rationality of standard propositional attitudes. Potential lines of defense (e.g. Peacocke 2001, Goldie 
2000, Charland 2002 and Tappolet 2003) include (i) arguing that the propositional content of emotion is 
not like that of belief (comparing it with the possible propositional content of perceptions), and (ii) claiming 
that the content of both emotions and perceptions might not be limited to propositional content. 
Recalcitrant emotions are also often discussed (e.g. Stocker 1992; Brady 2009). However, there are also 
various attempts to defend strong cognitivism against criticisms. See e.g. Wollheim 1999, Peacocke 2001, 
Goldie 2000, Charland 2002, and Tappolet 2003. 
56 Or as involving a judgment component. 
57 It is important to note that although we discuss the strong view (which is problematic for Savulescu & 
Persson insofar as they rule it out ex ante), the more moderate view of emotions (according to which 
emotions involve cognitions) would also be problematic because the cognitive element is nonetheless essential 
to all emotions. 
58 We note that there are other interesting ways to press the line that there is a cognitive dimension to moral 
flourishing. For example, Milgram  (2005) Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) submits that practical reasoning is essential to moral 
flourishing.  
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potential positive consequences could play such an offsetting role on their proposal. 
Moreover, given that Savulescu & Persson insist it might well be morally mandatory 
to pursue moral enhancement (while forbidden to pursue merely cognitive 
enhancement), it is crucial that we ask: it is the case that any type of enhancement 
that substantially influences morality is therefore a moral enhancement? What is a 
moral enhancement?  
Savulescu & Persson’s heavy reliance on the messy business of distinguishing 
between moral and cognitive enhancement is made even more problematic by the 
fact that the very concept of cognition is complex—some critics of the cognitive 
view of emotions (e.g. Power & Dalgleish (2008), Debes (2009)59) think that such 
confusions infect any attempt to discuss anything in the cognitive domain. Indeed, to 
the extent that ‘cognition’ is a vague term, there will be an action-guiding problem 
for any proposal making essential reference to a distinction between cognitive and 
moral enhancement. All the more reason, then, to move beyond reliance on the 
terms ‘moral’ and ‘cognitive’ when deciding which enhancements should be pursued. 
  
5.2 Beyond ‘cognitive’ and ‘moral’ enhancement 
In spite of the fact that Savulescu & Persson’s proposal is not appropriately sensitive 
to the connections between the aims of cognitive and moral enhancement, we agree 
with the core thought that it is important to improve the moral character of 
humanity and to be careful about the types of purely intellectual advancements made 
in the absence of corresponding moral advancements. In light of the objections 
developed in §§3-4, we are concerned that their approach to enhancement may end 
up being unproductive with respect to the end of most effectively improving the 
moral character of humanity (by, for example, quickly dismissing enhancements that 
‘look too cognitive’ or failing to create the best advancements towards moral 
flourishing for fear of incorporating too many cognitive enhancements).  
One commonsense alterative approach to potential enhancements is to 
consider them out with any essential reference to a moral/cognitive conceptual 
dichotomy. For example, for any enhancement E, we suggest considering the 
proposed goal of E (e.g. to improve trait T) and evaluating this in a wide range of 
ways. How successful is E likely to be at improving T? What other effects will it 
likely have in addition to improving T? Will it plausibly encourage people to treat 
each other better, or worse, and in what circumstances? Does it carry with it an 
increased risk of creating or utilising destructive technology? These are just some 
examples of appropriate questions to ask in place of whether the enhancement is moral or 
cognitive. Our suggestion aligns with a more general point suggested in work by 
Brownsword & Somsen (2009)60. As Brownsword suggests, it is “unclear … whether 
an ‘across-the-board’ set of principles for the regulation of human enhancement is 
appropriate.61”   
It should also be noted that the ethics of human enhancement features issues 
that, in practice, must be approached at least in part in the context of governance. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 R. Debes 2009. “Neither Here Nor There: The Cognitive Nature of Emotion.” Philosophical Studies 
146(1): 1–27; M. Power and T. Dalgleish 2008. Cognition and Emotion : From Order to Disorder, 2nd edition, 
Hove: Psychology Press. 
60 R. Brownsword, , and H. Somsen (2009) Law, Innovation and Technology: Before We Fast Forward — 
A Forum for Debate, Law, Innovation and Technology, 1, 1–73. Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing 
our attention to this paper. 
61 Cited also in Capps, et. al (op. cit. 257). 
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And, as Capps, et. al. (2012)62, notes, the questions that arise in this context will often 
be interdisciplinary. As Chadwick63  has mentioned, a sample of such questions 
include: “1) What is the likely impact on existing inequalities?; 2) What is the likely 
impact on choice, local and global?; and 3) What is the likely impact on vulnerable 
groups?” Plausibly, assessing traits in light of these governance-based questions will 
(as with the kinds of considerations previously mentioned) be drawing us away from 
the moral/cognitive dichotomy. 
Similarly, consider a problem-centred proposal. For some problematic threat 
P, we might consider a range of specific traits and assess: which traits are most 
causally responsible for P, and what are the risks of attempting to modify these traits? 
Likewise, regardless of which traits are responsible for P, are there other traits such that 
their modification or enhancement will raise the likelihood that P will be mitigated? 
What are the risks of attempting to enhance these traits? Again, the relevant questions 
do not rely on a distinction between moral and cognitive enhancement.  
Both the enhancement-centred and problem-centred approaches we’ve 
outlined here are compatible with the more general scientific approach to risk 
decision making: cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The general idea would be to treat the 
decision of whether and what kinds of enhancements to pursue in light of perceived 
risks (including the risks motivating Savulescu & Persson’s project) as a special case 
of a decision under risk, more generally. On such a proposal we can—without 
drawing moral and cognitive classifications—focus on three central questions. As 
Hansson (2007) 64  claims, the relevant philosophical issues that arise when one 
attempts to apply a CBA in risk decision making are: firstly, how do we frame the 
relevant alternatives? For example, what specific forms of enhancement, or problems, 
are relevant to the decision? Secondly, how do we characterize the possible outcomes 
for each alternative? Thirdly, how do we assign values to the alternatives? In focusing 
on these questions, we sidestep entirely the “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” 
scenario that arises once we try to implement the kind of injunction proposed by 
Savulescu & Persson. Of course, the outline of a proposal we’ve sketched here is 
incomplete, and cost-benefit analysis is just one potential avenue for approaching the 
enhancement debate. As critics of CBA will be quick to point out, the kind of 
unknown risks that may well feature in enhancement contexts might equally motivate 
the application of a kind of precautionary principle of the sort that features in 
debates in environmental ethics65. Again, we are open to such proposals; to reiterate:  
is beyond our aim here to defend any particular positive proposal. Our main 
objective has been to make it clear that the very risks motivating Savulescu & 
Persson to want to forbid cognitive enhancement and mandate moral enhancement 
are such that—if we are to take them seriously—will require that we leave talk of 
cognitive and moral enhancement behind. 
  
   
   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 B.J. Capps, R. Ter Meulen, R. & L. Nielson.. 2012. Human Enhancement Technologies: Understanding 
Governance, Policies and Regulatory Structures in the Global Context. Asian Bioethics Review, 4(4), 251-258. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing this paper to our attention. 
63 Ibid. p. 256. 
64 S.O. Hansson. 2007. Philosophical problems in cost–benefit analysis.Economics and Philosophy, 23(02), 163-
183. 
65 For a defense of the precautionary principle against recent charges, see Sandin, P., Peterson, M., Hansson, 
S. O., Rudén, C., & Juthe, A. (2002). Five charges against the precautionary principle. Journal of Risk 
Research, 5(4), 287-299. 
